Introduction
In the age of algorithms and autocrats, John Anthony Castro was a digital David, slinging lawsuits at political Goliaths with the audacity of a revolutionary and the credentials of a statesman. Born to Mexican-American military parents, he carried not only the pride of his lineage but the burden of a system he believed was breaking. A tax attorney with a vision, Castro carved out his place in the gilded maze of American wealth and law, eventually founding AI Tax, a revolutionary fintech firm once valued at a staggering $180 million.
He was no stranger to the grind—Georgetown Law molded his mind, but it was his relentless pursuit of efficiency, justice, and relevance in the 21st century that made him a tech mogul. AI Tax wasn’t just a business—it was a movement, promising a smarter, more accessible way to navigate the nation’s labyrinthine tax codes.
But 2024 would not be kind to rebels.
Amidst a polarizing presidential election, Castro launched a daring legal offensive—suing Donald Trump under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, invoking the insurrection clause. It was a move that defied party lines and challenged constitutional silence, and in doing so, placed him squarely in the crosshairs of the establishment he had once courted.
What followed was a dizzying descent. Investigations turned into indictments. The man who once faced down Trump was now facing federal prosecutors. Convicted of tax fraud—charges he still vehemently denies—Castro now serves time in a federal prison, a long shadow cast over what was once a golden empire.
His fall was as spectacular as his ascent. AI Tax is no more. His multimillion-dollar fortune evaporated under the heat of legal and political fire. His wife and two children, once basking in the glow of Castro’s success, are now trying to piece together a life with their patriarch behind bars. The family home has been sold, the future recalibrated, dreams deferred.
Yet, behind prison walls, Castro remains a man unyielding. He proclaims his innocence with the same fervor that fueled his campaigns and has submitted a motion to appeal his conviction.
By. Renaldo C. McKenzie
Motion Submitted by John Anthony Castro
May 12, 2025
_______________________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
_______________________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- Case No. 4:24-CR-1
JOHN ANTHONY CASTRO
_______________________________________________________________________________
MOTION TO STRIKE THE CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT ALLEGED STIPULATIONS AT ECF 36
AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
_______________________________________________________________________________
Defendant John Anthony Castro, pro se, files this Motion, verified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, to Strike the constitutionally deficient alleged “stipulations” at ECF 36 that refer to paragraphs in the Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact at ECF 34.
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the weeks preceding trial, Defendant made it clear to his counsel, Jason Freeman, that he would not stipulate that any deductions were without factual basis since there were thousands of pages of documents that the client-taxpayers themselves provided to Defendant’s firm that definitively established the factual basis for the deductions.
Defendant was told it would be time-consuming for the Government to call all of the taxpayer-witnesses.
Nevertheless, Defendant insisted that each taxpayer be thoroughly cross-examined regardless of how long it took. Defendant was adamant about confronting any and all accusers. In fact, Defendant expressly instructed Freeman to utilize cross-examination to effectively re-conduct the tax interviews with client-taxpayers utilizing the same taxpayer interview packets and documents the client-taxpayers provided to prove that the taxpayers provided the data. It was always Defendant’s intent to compel the Government to prove each essential element of the offense for each and every count. Freeman and Mick Mickelsen were concerned with the length of the trial.
Freeman and Mick Mickelsen also stated that Assistant U.S. Attorney P.J. Mietl (“AUSA Mietl”) had confirmed that the Government was not making a fact-based argument. In other words, AUSA Mietl communicated to defense counsel Jason Freeman that he was not arguing that the deductions had no factual basis; only that the deductions were without legal basis.
On Mother’s Day, Sunday, May 12, 2024, Defendant was out-of-town visiting his mother in New Braunfels, Texas. See ECF 215-2, Page 7 of 7 (“Our guy is out of town for mother’s day”). Freeman contacted Defendant and asked him to prepare “proposed testimonial stipulations” on Mother’s Day while Defendant was celebrating Mother’s Day with his own mother as well as his wife/mother of his children. Defendant prepared a document of Proposed Stipulations and sent them to Freeman. Defendant completed the Proposed Stipulations at or around 5pm and emailed them to Freeman.
The following day, Monday, May 13, 2024, at 12:16pm, as Defendant was driving on IH-35 heading back home to Mansfield, Texas, which Apple iPhone Geolocation data confirms, Defendant received an email from Mick Mickelsen indicating what Defendant understood to be a request that Defendant “must agree to the proposed stipulations” that Defendant previously sent to Freeman. While driving with his wife and two children asleep in the car, Defendant responded from his iPhone to say, “I agree to them.” The metadata from the email evidences that the response came from Defendant’s iPhone, and Apple Geolocation data confirms this was sent from an area between New Braunfels and Mansfield. Defendant assumed Mickelsen’s request was some sort of technical rule requirement that Defendant had to still expressly agree to the proposed stipulations that Defendant himself drafted since Mickelsen said “you must agree to the proposed stipulations.” In other words, even though Defendant drafted them, Defendant presumed that the rules still required that Defendant “must agree to the proposed stipulations” that he himself drafted to proceed to the next step. Mickelsen did not provide any context to his request.
Unbeknownst to Defendant, there had been a significant amount of discussions behind the scene.
According to ECF 215-2, on Mother’s Day, Sunday, May 12, 2024 at 9:48am, Freeman emailed AUSA Mietl to presumably reassure him that he had “not forgotten about” some sort of stipulations. Freeman assured AUSA Mietl that he would have them for him that day. Defendant was not copied on this email.
It is presumably around this time that Freeman contacted Defendant to ask him to prepare a set of “proposed testimonial stipulations,” which Defendant began working on.
At 4:44pm, near the end of the day, ASUA Mietl then irately replied “God forbid he focus on his criminal trial that will put him in prison for 15 years.” AUSA Mietl then asked, despite Freeman reassuring him he would provide them that day, “Will we get these tonight?” to which he added “Fourth day in a row I have been promised them.” AUSA Mietl also added, “I can assure you I will be consistent with what I have said before and be reasonable.” It is unclear what AUSA Mietl was referring to. Defendant was not copied on this email.
At or around 5pm, Defendant sent Freeman his “proposed testimonial stipulations.”
At 6:16pm, Freeman emailed AUSA Mietl a copy of Defendant’s Proposed Testimonial and Evidentiary Stipulations. Freeman also added, “We believe that yours are acceptable.” “We believe” is not an agreement. Something may be “acceptable” but not yet actually accepted. Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating what document Freeman viewed and is referring to here. Defendant was not copied on this email.
At 6:40pm, AUSA Mietl responded, “Alright, Working on this now. Will send back a clean version and a tracked change version (hopefully with few changes), removing the evidentiary stipulations. Lets try to finish and file tonight.” Defendant was not copied on this email.
Later that evening at 10:10pm, AUSA Mietl emailed Freeman with massive amount of changes. In that email, AUSA Mietl wrote, “I have attached three doc[ument]s. A tracked changes version which shows what I did and a clean version that we would file as an attachment to the Notice. There are really only three types of changes: I removed the proposed stip[ulation]s for those witnesses we are calling as witnesses. There are six such witnesses (Jackson, Lampkins, Natt, Meyer, Ragsdale, Putica). We did not ask you to stipulate to testimony with respect to them and I don’t see why we would stipulate if we will have them on the stand. I removed the proposed stip[ulation]s for when tax returns were uploaded to Smart Vault by Castro. I do not have evidence of that and our witnesses dispute this. Castro or another witness can testify to those facts if there is evidence of it. I removed the reference as to which employee conducted the interview or took other actions where I do not have a document showing me that.” In effect, AUSA Mietl gutted and removed all of the substantive stipulations that would have established the careful segmented process that guaranteed all of Defendant’s firm’s returns were factually accurate. These were major, substantive changes to the proposed stipulations. AUSA Mietl then added “On the clean version, I took the liberty of cleaning up the formatting a bit and adding a title. Please let me know if this is acceptable. If so, we can attach this to the Agreed Stipulations of Evidence, which is also attached (see the addition which references your proposed stip[ulation]s in #3).” Defendant was not copied on this email.
The next day, Monday, May 13, 2024, at 11:41am, Freeman responded, “PJ, Mr. Castro will agree to not have the employee who conducted the interview listed and to not list the date/time of the upload of the tax return to smart vault.” Freeman never asked Defendant whether he agreed to this. Secondly, Freeman is not clairvoyant, so his speculation as to what Defendant would agree to is just that: speculation. This did not establish an agreement. Defendant was not copied on this email.
Only four minutes later at 11:45am, AUSA Mietl replied, “Ok, thank you. Can I file the attached then?” Defendant was not copied on this email.
One minute later at 11:46am, Freeman responded, “Please direct all further questions about it to Mick.” Defendant was not copied on this email.
Three minutes later at 11:49am, AUSA Mietl emailed Mickelsen and asked, “Mick, may I file this as agreed?” This question was intentionally deceptively worded by AUSA Mietl to give the appearance that there was already an agreement in place. Defendant was not copied on this email.
Twenty-seven minutes later at 12:16pm, for the first time since the day prior when Defendant separately spoke with Freeman and provided the “proposed stipulations,” Defendant is sent an email by Mickelsen. Without any context, knowledge, or understanding of the situation, Mickelsen, without providing any context, writes, “John, As the defendant you must agreement to the proposed stipulations.” Up to this point, the only “proposed stipulations” that Defendant is aware of are the ones that Defendant himself sent to Freeman the evening prior on Mother’s Day. Mickelsen adds, “I strongly urge you to say yes and let’s put this matter to rest.” Defendant assumed that there was some sort of technical rule requiring Defendant to still agree to the proposed stipulations that he himself provided to Freeman.
Therefore, as explained above, while driving home from New Braunfels to Mansfield with his wife and two children in the family Subaru, Defendant responded at 2:07pm, “I agree to them.” According to the Government, Defendant read the 208 pages that encompass ECFs 34 and 36 in only 121 minutes. That’s one page every 35 seconds. Not only implausible but ridiculous.
Unbeknownst to Defendant, Mickelsen then forwarded the email at 2:36pm to AUSA Mietl with two attachments: “Agreed Stipulations of Evidence” and “Exhibit A Castro Proposed Stips.” Mickelsen did not copy Freeman or Defendant on this email. In the email, Mickelsen wrote, “We agree. Done!” Defendant was not copied on this email.
AUSA Mietl then filed ECF 36 bearing the typed name of “/s/ Jason Freeman.” AUSA Mietl did not obtain Freeman’s actual wet-ink signature on the document. AUSA Mietl did not scan the actual signature and place the image of the scanned signature onto ECF 36. In fact, Freeman never even saw ECF 36 before it was filed. The metadata of the original PDF of ECF 36 will reveal that Freeman never accessed or viewed, much less signed, the document. Nevertheless, AUSA Mietl represented to the Court that Freeman “electronically signed” the document both then and as recently as April 30, 2025, when AUSA Mietl responded at ECF 215. An indisputable and verifiable lie.
As the trial transcript now reveals, AUSA Mietl never introduced the Stipulations of Evidence at ECF 36 “into evidence during trial” as AUSA Mietl falsely claimed at ECF 215. An indisputable and verifiable lie.
Moreover, at the Pre-Trial Hearing, the Government continued to assert a purely law-based theory of guilt when the Court opened the Pre-Trial Hearing with the following statement from the bench: “So this case is about outlandish legal positions” to which AUSA Mietl confirmed and said that Defendant was nothing more than a “sophisticated tax protestor.” Please note that this particular exchange is subject of a separate Motion to Correct the Transcript since it appears in audio recordings but not in the official transcript. In other words, the Government’s theory of guilt was still that there was no legal basis for Defendant claiming certain expenses as deductions under the Internal Revenue Code (i.e., frivolous legal positions); not that there was no factual basis for the existence of the underlying expense (i.e., fabricated deductions). Based on the Government’s false assurances that its case was solely a question of law, Defendant waived his right to a trial by jury and instead moved for a bench trial by judge. A product of fraudulent inducement and prosecutorial cajolery.
Prior to trial, Defendant had been told that the Anti-Hybrid Representation Rule prevented him from speaking at trial and that it was not uncommon for a judge to have a defendant removed from the courtroom for speaking.
To reiterate, at no point were the alleged Stipulations of Evidence “entered into evidence during trial” as AUSA Mietl falsely claimed at ECF 215. The first time the Government made any reference whatsoever to “stipulations” during any proceeding was not until Tuesday, May 21, 2024. See Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, Pg 89, Lines 7-10. Defendant understood the Government’s statement to be that there was a stipulated dismissal regarding the counts associated with ten (10) taxpayers for failure to appear: “Your honor, if it helps, the parties have already stipulated to many of those witnesses. Ten of them we’ve removed, so we’re only calling six. We’ve gotten through three now. We have three to go.” Trial Transcript, Volume 4 of 9, Page 89, Lines 7-10. The Government indicated they “removed” ten, which Defendant understood to be that the counts were being removed from the case and dismissed.
The Government was intentionally being vague and cryptic to prevent Defendant from becoming aware of the situation.
The Government added, “The defense has been gracious enough to try to stipulate to ten of the witnesses.” Id., Lines 17-19. There is a difference between one who will “try” to stipulate and one who “has actually” stipulated to something. From Defendant’s perspective, it appeared that the Government attempted to get the defense to “try” to stipulate and agree to something, but ultimately the witnesses were not being called, removed from the case, and those counts being dismissed.
Later, the Government stated that “prior to trial, we have a stipulation on paragraphs 232 to 256, which encompasses her testimony, and it covers exhibits 131 to 143 and the defense had no objection to the stipulation or the exhibits.” Id., Page 90 Lines 7-11. There is no meaningful disclosure here as to what is being stipulated to other than references to paragraphs that were not discussed in any detail or read into the record.
The Court then responded, “Those – the statements of fact in your document 34… are now stipulated to; is that correct?… Is that correct counsel for the defendant? Mr. Freeman?” Id., Page 91.
At this moment, defense counsel Freeman is compelled to confer with Mick Mickelsen because he never viewed the Stipulations of Evidence at ECF 36 much less signed it. Freeman asked Mickelsen, “Are those the proposed stipulations?” Freeman was referring to Defendant’s Proposed Stipulations. Mickelsen responded, “Yes, those were the proposed stipulations.” Based on Mickelsen’s reply, Freeman answered the Court, “Yes, your Honor.” Id. Defendant understood this to be the Proposed Testimonial Stipulations that Defendant sent to Freeman on the evening of Mother’s Day.
The Government made a series of other comments regarding stipulations. “[W]e did a truncated version because of the stipulations.” Id., Line 116. There is a reference to stipulations but no discussion as to what they are. What was stipulated to? It could be basic information about the taxpayer. During another direct examination, the Government said to its witness, “We didn’t make them fly out here because we got some stipulations. Is that your understanding?” Id., Line 146. Stipulation to dismiss? Stipulation as to what? A stipulation is simply an agreement. Without more, it is unclear what has allegedly been stipulated to. Later, the Government, during direct examination of another taxpayer, says, “This relates to Paul and Alyssa Clayton, which they didn’t come and testify but their facts are stipulated to.” Trial Transcript, Volume 5 of 9, Pages 116-117. Again, what facts are stipulated to? The fact that they’re unavailable and don’t plan to testify? There’s no detail.
When the Government rested its case at trial without calling all of the taxpayer-witnesses, Defendant was under the impression those counts were being dismissed for failure of the witnesses to appear.
On the final day of trial, the Court said, “My impression is that the government believes that it has proven, on the counts that are stipulated to, has proven all of the elements of the crime through those stipulations” to which the Government responded, “That is correct, your Honor.” Id., Volume 7 of 9, Page 5, Lines 7-11. The Court then added, “Including willfulness” to which the Government responded, “Yes, your Honor.” Id. Lines 12-14. The Court then said, “But the defense, I’m inferring, admits to those elements, except for willfulness?”
At this moment, Defendant knew something was terribly wrong and immediately leaned over to ask Freeman what the Judge meant. However, Freeman ignored Defendant and responded to the Judge, “I think [uncertain and confused; neither clear nor unequivocal] that is accurate – if there are [legal] positions that were objectively incorrect… if you find willfulness, that would be sufficient to infer” willfulness with regard to the others. Id., Lines 28-29. It was clear from this response that Freeman was uncertain about what stipulations the Court was referring to. It should have also been clear to the Court that a response of “I think” regarding a question of whether there have been stipulations tantamount to guilt should be more clear and unequivocal.
In addition, Freeman’s response made it clear he was talking about the Government’s theory of legal frivolity (i.e., frivolous legal positions); not factual falsity (i.e., fabricated deductions).
Defendant reached over and sternly asked Freeman, “What are they talking about? I never stipulated that anything in the returns were false. Clarify that because it sounds like you just conceded every single element except subjective willfulness.”
Freeman then clarified to the Court, “I want to be clear, we don’t concede necessarily that any of the stipulations satisfy that there was a [false or] fraudulent item on the return, but I just want that to be clear.” Id. Please note that the bracketed portion in the preceding sentence is currently the subject of a present Motion to Correct the Transcripts filed with this Court pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). This should have triggered the Court to investigate the matter further. Instead, the Court adjourned.
After the lunch break pending the verdict, Defendant returned to the courtroom and was shocked to be found guilty on all 33 counts considering his understanding that ten (10) taxpayer-witnesses had been removed and dismissed. Thus, it became apparent that the Court had, in fact, relied on some stipulations to find Defendant guilty on all of the counts associated with the non-testifying taxpayers that Defendant thought were dismissed.
For months thereafter, Defendant asked defense counsel Jason Freeman what stipulations the Court had referred to, which he never answered. However, for fear of being unrepresented at Sentencing, Defendant did his best to keep the relationship cordial. Defendant was first held at the Johnson County Correctional Facility and, after July 16, 2024, at the Federal Medical Facility’s Jail Unit in Fort Worth, Texas. Neither facilities provide access to the internet, PACER, or other means of viewing one’s own court case-related filings.
After Sentencing, Defendant terminated defense counsel Jason Freeman and notified the Court of his dissent to any purported stipulations in multiple court filings, including, but not limited to, ECFs 186 and 193. In fact, in one of the Court’s Orders at ECF 212 denying Defendant’s pro se motion to strike “any” and all “testimonial stipulations,” the Court stated the following: “Defendant fails to identify, either by exhibit number, file date, or witness name, the alleged stipulations about which he refers.” Aside from the fact that Defendant had moved to strike “any” testimonial stipulations, Defendant could not identify any particular and specific detail because the Federal Bureau of Prisons does not permit access to PACER and former defense counsel Jason Freeman would not reply to repeated requests for information regarding any purported stipulations. It is absolutely absurd and ludicrous for a court to claim that a defendant’s lack of factual specificity is grounds to deny relief when the conditions the court knowingly sentenced the defendant to do not provide the means of discovering those specific details. It was finally the act of kindness of Paralegal Liana Waite in identifying ECF 36 as the basis for the Court’s finding of guilt on all of the counts associated with non-testifying taxpayer-witnesses, which is evidenced by a series of message exchanges via the BOP’s TRULINCS closed messaging system.
Only a few weeks ago, Defendant finally learned that on May 13, 2024, AUSA Mietl filed a document titled “Stipulations of Evidence” at ECF 36 wherein he claimed that former defense counsel Jason Freeman had allegedly signed and agreed to certain stipulations of evidence.
AUSA Mietl’s filing did not contain a scanned image of Jason Freeman’s signature. AUSA Mietl does not have a paper copy of the allegedly wet-ink signed stipulations of evidence.
Freeman never signed, electronically or physically on paper, the “Stipulations of Evidence” at ECF 36 that were electronically filed by AUSA Mietl. AUSA Mietl misrepresented to the Court that Defendant, by and through counsel, had signed the “Stipulations of Evidence.” An analysis of the document’s metadata will reveal that Freeman never viewed or accessed, much less signed, that document.
The alleged “evidence,” which Defendant had not seen until a few weeks ago, were incorporated references to certain paragraphs in a separate filing by the prosecution. For example, one line in ECF 36 reads: “If called, the following witnesses would testify as set forth in the following identified paragraphs of the Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dkt. No. 34):… (1) Paul and Alyssa Clayton – Paragraphs 174-191… (2) James Boggs and Frances Fifis-Boggs – Paragraphs 193-230.”
The separate filing referred to is labeled “Trial Brief” but actually titled “Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” at ECF 34.
According to the Government, for example, Freeman allegedly stipulated to 38 of the Government’s 39 proposed findings of fact with regard to taxpayer James Boggs (Counts 3, 4, and 5). In effect, the Government argues that Freeman effectively stipulated to Defendant’s factual guilt. Similarly, for example, the Government claims that Freeman stipulated to 99% of the Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact with regard to Paul Clayton (Count 2). In effect, the alleged stipulations were tantamount to a guilty plea; a conclusion supported by the Court’s and Government’s own comments at the conclusion of the trial, which will be discussed in more detail below.
Aside from the fact that neither a “Trial Brief” nor “Proposed Findings of Fact” are “evidence,” there were not sworn statements from any of the Government’s witnesses. Additionally, none of the alleged stipulated “evidence,” which was actually testimonial hearsay, were discussed in any detail in the presence of Defendant or read into the record during trial. Neither the prosecution not the Court ever discussed the subject or content of the “stipulations.” In fact, it was not even clear what was allegedly stipulated to: basic facts, tax documents, testimony, dismissal, or something else. The transcripts reveal that the Court and Government operated on a presumption that Defendant was aware of the details of the stipulations. But Defendant was not aware. Neither the Court nor the Government ever discussed in any detail the content of any allegedly stipulated testimony. Defendant had absolutely no knowledge of any testimonial stipulations or the content thereof. In fact, as will be discussed later, neither did Freeman.
Moreover, at the commencement of trial on Monday, May 20, 2024, the Court indicated that it would only consider evidence and exhibits actually introduced at trial. It should be noted that this too is conveniently missing from the official transcript but appears in audio recordings of the proceedings, which is being separately addressed in a Motion to Correct the Transcripts filed with this Court pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). Nevertheless, the alleged testimonial stipulations were never admitted into evidence “during trial” as AUSA Mietl later claimed in ECF 215 much less read into the record or discussed in any detail that would have given Defendant reasonable notice of what was being stipulated to.
However, at the conclusion of trial, the Court expressed its understanding that there existed alleged stipulations that admitted every single element of the offense including willfulness to which the prosecution agreed. In other words, as the Court and Government saw the alleged stipulations, they were tantamount to a guilty plea.
- APPLICABLE LAW
- Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to confront the witnesses against him. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). Specifically, the Clause bars the introduction of testimonial evidence against a criminal defendant unless the proponent shows both that the declarant is unavailable and that the defendant had a “prior opportunity for cross examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
Nevertheless, counsel in a criminal case may waive his client’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence, so long as the defendant [having full knowledge] does not dissent from his attorney’s decision, and “so long as it can be said that the attorney’s decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy.” U.S. v. Johnson, 954 F.2d 1015, 1020 (5th Cir. 1992).
Nevertheless, there still must be evidence that the defendant had knowledge of the stipulations. See Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975, 981 (6th Cir. 1993) (“there must be evidence in the record to support” a defendant’s waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation for it to be valid); Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 956 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 684 U.S. 1, 7 (1966)) (“the law seems to be clear that the right of confrontation is personal and fundamental and cannot be [solely] waived by counsel”), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 188 (1998); U.S. v. Williams, 632 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011) (“this Court is inclined to require that defendants make a clear [express or implied] waiver of their Sixth Amendment right”).
The Fifth Circuit, along with nearly every other circuit, permits an implied waiver by acquiescence (i.e., knowledge plus inaction).
In the 1980 Stephens case, the Fifth Circuit crafted the “so long as the defendant does not dissent” standard. U.S. v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1980). In Stephens, the Fifth Circuit found that “[b]efore the stipulation was accepted,” the trial court engaged in a direct exchange with the defendant confirming his agreement to the stipulations. Id. at 233. Moreover, the “stipulations were read in open court” to ensure the defendant fully understood the testimony to which his counsel was stipulating to. Id. at 234; also see U.S. v. Anderson, No. 93-7490 (5th Cir. 1994) (“the court read the stipulated testimony” in open court); Sanders v. U.S., 20-CO-0058 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“the parties read stipulations into the record”); U.S. v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The government read [witness]’s stipulated testimony” into the record); U.S. v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985) (“stipulated testimony was read into the record”); U.S. v. Corr, 434 F.Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“The terms of the stipulation… were then read in open court… [and] placed on the record in [the defendant’s] presence.”).
In summary, the key aspect of the Stephens case was that because the “stipulations were read in open court,” the absence of any “dissent” from the defendant was sufficient to find a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation. See Stephens, 609 F.2d at 234.
Nearly two decades later, the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in the 1999 Reveles case. In U.S. v. Reveles, the Fifth Circuit found that, shortly “[b]efore the trial began, the prosecution announced [in open court in the presence of the defendant] its intent to introduce [a specific article of evidence described as] a written statement given by [a co-defendant]. The statement incriminated [the defendant],” which the defendant was aware of. 190 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1999). Defense counsel said “that he would not make any… objection” because it was “not that damaging.” Id. This exchange, which described in great detail the proposed statement, the written form by which it would be introduced, and the content, all took place in the presence of the defendant. As in the Stephens case, it was reasonable to conclude that the defendant understood who made the statement, the content of the statement, and the implications the statements had on his case. Therefore, there existed solid grounds to conclude, through the defendant’s inaction in failing to “dissent” during this entire detailed exchange, that the defendant acquiesced to his attorney’s decision to stipulate to the introduction of the written statement of a co-defendant. With full knowledge, the defendant did “not dissent.” Stephens, 609 F.2d at 232.
The Fifth Circuit also explained that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right [e.g., FRCrP 51 requiring a contemporaneous objection at trial], waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)); also see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[w]here testimonial statement are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protections to the vagaries of the rules.”); Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 794 (2024) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 105 (2012)) (“Concepts central to the application of the Confrontation Clause are ultimately matters of federal constitutional law that are not dictated by state or federal evidentiary [much less procedural] rules.”); 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) (“rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”).
In the 2015 Ceballos case, the Fifth Circuit clarified and held that the “Government has the burden of proving the defendant effected a valid waiver.” U.S. v. Ceballos, 789 F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir. 2015). Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit also found that courts “should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Id. (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986)).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has similarly held that “where an apparent waiver of a defendant’s fundamental right seems detrimental to his interests, the court may well have a duty to inquire directly of the defendant whether his action is knowing and voluntary” to ensure the validity of the waiver. U.S. v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Therefore, because the Government carries the burden of proof, the Government must refute every allegation raised against waiver. Thus, an evidentiary hearing is unavoidable in this context since there exists material facts that are in dispute that must be resolved by the court.
Before the trial court in Ceballos, the prosecution first sought to declare the witness at issue unavailable in order to introduce a video deposition but later decided to withdraw that effort. Ceballos, 789 F.3d at 614. Instead, the prosecution obtained a written statement from the witness and sought to introduce that sworn statement as evidence. Id. The Court asked defense counsel whether he was “in agreement was to the admissibility of” the sworn statement to which “[d]efense counsel responded affirmatively’ after which the “court then admitted [almost] all exhibits,” including the sworn statement. Id.
To be certain of everyone’s intent, the Ceballos trial court again asked if there were any other “major evidentiary issues” remaining. Id. The prosecution emphasized that “defense counsel had raised no objection to [the witness’] sworn statement” to which the “[d]efense counsel explained that he had no objection… but he conditioned his agreement to admit the exhibits on the opportunity to cross-examine their proponents.” Id. All of this exchange occurred in the presence of the defendant, including the reference to the sworn statement of a specifically named witness. During actual trial, a CBP agent “recited [the witness’] written statement” into the record in open court in the presence of the defendant. Id. The defendant “did not object to either” the government agent who read the written statement or to the written statement itself. Id. Moreover, the defendant had the opportunity to “cross-examine each of the CBP agents who served as a proponent of the stipulated” sworn statement. Id. Because nothing in the record on appeal reflected that the defendant “disagreed with… counsel’s decision to stipulate to the admission of [the non-testifying witness’] statement,” the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant had “effectively waiver her right to confrontation.” Id.
As in Stephens and Reveles, the details of the stipulated evidence, including who the statement was from and the content thereof, were discussed in great detail in the presence of the defendant who could then be judicially deemed to have had full knowledge and understanding to effectuate an intelligent waiver.
In the 2011 Bullcoming case, the U.S. Supreme Court reinforced its prior decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts regarding waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation. In an illuminating dissent, Justice Kennedy found that “in the ordinary case that proceeds to trial [there is now] no good reason for defense counsel to waive the right of confrontation as the court now [more powerfully] interprets it.” Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissent).
In the 2022 Hemphill case, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a rare 8-1 commanding decision, held that “the role of the trial judge is… to ensure that the Constitutional procedures for testing the reliability of [testimonial hearsay] evidence are followed.” Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. 140, 152-53 (2022).
The Supreme Court also reiterated that waiver of the Right of Confrontation could be implied by the “failure to object to the offending evidence” or other “conduct that is incompatible with a demand to confront adverse witnesses.” Id. at 157. In a separate concurrence by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh, they explained that “[i]mplied waiver can be established” when “an individual – who with full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise – has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protections those rights afford.” Id. (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385 (2010)).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 Hemphill “full understanding” requirement is reflected in the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in Stephens in 1980, Reveles in 1999, and Ceballos in 2015. In all three of the Fifth Circuit’s major Sixth Amendment waiver cases, the defendants were made aware of the content of the stipulated testimony and evidence, the statements were read into the record in open court, and there was, therefore, no concern that the defendant was unaware of what the jurists (the prosecution, defense counsel, and the trial court judge) in the courtroom were talking about.
Courts must “not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst., 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937). “To preserve the protections of the Bill of Rights for hard-pressed defendants, [courts must] indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights.” Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
Both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent clearly and firmly establish that the Government must prove a defendant had “full understanding” of the details of any stipulations to ensure the existence of an “intelligent waiver” as was the case in Stephens, Reveles, and Ceballos. See Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967) (“the attorneys read into the record stipulated testimony… in open court”); Stephens, 609 F.2d at 233-34 (defendant had “full knowledge of the implications” because the “stipulations were read in open court”); Reveles, 190 F.3d at 683, 693 n. 6 (defense said it would “not make any Bruton objection” to the co-defendant’s written statement, that it was “not that damaging,” and the “judge then said he would allow the statement” in front of the defendant without dissent who was aware of the content of the written statement); U.S. v. Banks, 343 Fed. Appx. 992, 993 (5th Cir. 2009) (“prosecutor read into the record the statement of stipulated evidence”); U.S. v. Adams, 439 Fed. Appx. 240, 342 (5th Cir. 2011) (the defendant “was made aware of the issues surrounding the witness’ unavailability” and “participated in his attorney’s decision to admit [the] written statement”); U.S. v. Nunez-Rodriguez, No. 4:10-cv-3713 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“During trial, the Government read into the record… stipulations.”); Wiggins v. Stephens, No. 3:13-cv-2418 (N.D. Tex 2014) (“waived the right to confrontation and cross-examination… and agreed that the witness’ testimony could be read into the record” in open court); Ceballos, 789 F.3d at 614 (“Agent… recited [key witness’] written statement” on the stand during direct examination in open court in front of the defendant without dissent).
The “does not dissent” standard should not be interpreted to require a formal objection pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 51 since the Fifth Circuit’s Anti-Hybrid Representation Rule prevents a represented defendant from making pro se objections. See Carrier v. Trico Prods. Corp., No. 1:17-cv-248 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (citing U.S. v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1211 (5th Cir. 1986)) (“[B]ecause parties do not have the right to a hybrid representation… the Court struck [movant]’s pro se objections from the record.”); also see Hestand v. TDCJ-CID, No. 6:20-cv-71 (E.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Dean v. Smith County, Tex., 90 Fed. Appx. 75, 76 (5th Cir. 2004)) (“[P]ro se objections are not properly before the Court because [movant] is not entitled to hybrid representation.”); Ayo v. La. Dept. of Corr., No. 19-00449 (M.D. La. 2020) (“The Court does not consider [movant]’s pro se objection here because hybrid representation – partly counseled, partly pro se – is not allowed.”).
Moreover, Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b) expressly states that “[i]f a party does not have the opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later prejudice that party.” Therefore, in addition to the rule that the Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation is not subject to forfeiture as explained in the Fifth Circuit’s Stephens case, because the Fifth Circuit’s Anti-Hybrid Representation Rule denies represented defendants the opportunity to object at trial, the absence of an objection would not even be sufficient grounds to find that a defendant forfeited his Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation much less waived it. See Stephens 609 F.2d at 232.
Aside from the fact that the Anti-Hybrid Representation Rule creates a constitutionally violative chilling effect with regard to a defendant’s ability to express dissent toward any of his attorney’s decisions at trial, defendants are often threatened that they will have to view their proceedings via a muted camera from a holding cell if they talk on their own behalf during any proceedings. Moreover, defendants are never informed that they are permitted to object to any actions of their attorneys at trial.
One cannot express dissent, much less formally object, without knowledge of the details of any purported stipulations, which is why circuits across the United States have impliedly required stipulated testimony or statements to be read into the record in open court or, at the very least, discussed in detail in the presence of the defendant to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver.
All of the Fifth Circuit’s case law on waiver of confrontation has adhered to the U.S. Supreme Court’s nearly century-old mandate that the “determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver… must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
Therefore, the law of the Fifth Circuit is abundantly clear: counsel may waive a client’s Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation via stipulations if and only if the Government can prove that the defendant had full knowledge and understanding of what was being stipulated to.
In addition, stipulations must be correctly identified as evidentiary stipulations, testimonial stipulations, or factual stipulations. Evidentiary would be a written sworn statement. Testimonial stipulations are what a person will say whereas a factual stipulation is the conclusion drawn from what is said; a monumental difference. They were vaguely labeled evidentiary stipulations but referenced in the email at ECF 215-2 as testimonial stipulations while referenced at trial as factual stipulations. Not surprisingly, it was because Freeman never actually viewed or authorized his name to be digitally signed by AUSA Mietl onto the document.
- Substantive Signature Requirements under Local Rules and Contract Law
NDTX LCrR 49.5(d) mandates that an “attorney who submits a document by electronic means that is signed by another person… must (1) include a scanned image of the other person’s signature… and (2) maintain the signed paper copy of the document for one year after the final disposition of the case.” For clarification, the interjecting phrase “other than… a document signed by a defendant” carves-out an issue expressly addressed by LCrR 49.6, which is inapplicable here.
Unlike non-substantive procedural rules that are still mercilessly applied to incarcerated pro se defendants and relied upon to sua sponte strike filings from the docket, this particular local rule was intended to ensure compliance with substantive principles of law regarding agreements.
Failure to comply with NDTX LCrR 49.5(d) renders the document “unsigned.”
Even in the civil context, courts have been wise enough to “not accept an unsigned stipulation.” In Re Complaint of River Constr. Inc., No. 4:22-cv-2413 (S.D. Tex. 2023). The standard for criminal cases should be at least equal to but preferably greater than the civil standard.
- The Right to Plead Not Guilty
Lastly, a set of stipulations that, when viewed as a whole, are “tantamount to a guilty plea,” are violative of the constitutionally protected right to plead not guilty. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966); Stephens, 609 F.2d at 234, n.2.
“[B]ecause a stipulated bench trial may be tantamount to a guilty plea… [a]lthough district courts are not required to conduct an in personam examination of the defendant to ensure that… waivers are knowing and voluntary… such a personal evaluation may be a valuable prophylactic measure.” U.S. v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003).
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an incredibly rare 9-0 decision in 2013, mandated that a “lawyer must not ‘override his client’s desire… to plead not guilty'” in any way, shape, or form, including, but not limited to, a de facto guilty plea by stipulating to 99% of the Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22 (2013) (quoting Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 7-8).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 Burt v. Titlow case reiterated what the Fifth Circuit had long ago held: “Our decision today should not be viewed as in conflict with the [constitutional] rule that counsel cannot ‘stipulate without defendant’s consent, facts establishing the guilt of the accused.'” Stephens, 609 F.2d at 234, n.2 (quoting Palfy v. Cardwell, 448 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1971)). “The constitutional right affected that in situation is the right of the defendant in a criminal case to plead not guilty.” Id. (citing Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 7).
In a situation where any set of stipulations arguably establish factual guilt, a trial court has a constitutional duty to ensure it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent with “full understanding.”
III. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
In the instant case, “the Government has the burden of proving [Defendant] effected a valid waiver.” Ceballos, 789 F.3d at 614. Thus, this Court must “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Id.
First and foremost, Defendant has thoroughly expressed his “dissent” to the alleged Stipulations of “Evidence” in various filings, including, but not limited to, ECFs 186 and 193.
Secondly, the alleged stipulations at ECF 36 were neither factual stipulations nor evidentiary stipulations. The alleged stipulations at ECF 36 were testimonial stipulations that were never read into the record or, at the very least, discussed in detail in the presence of the defendant in open court as the Fifth Circuit has always required in order to ensure the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver. See Stephens, 609 F.2d at 233-34 (defendant had “full knowledge of the implications” because the “stipulations were read in open court”); Anderson, No. 93-7490 (“the court read the stipulated testimony” in open court); Banks, 343 Fed. Appx. at 993 (“prosecutor read into the record the statement of stipulated evidence”); Ceballos, 789 F.3d at 614 (“Agent… recited [key witness]’ statement” on the stand during direct examination in open court).
Because the stipulations were not read into the record in open court or, at the very least, discussed in detail in the presence of Defendant, it cannot be said that Defendant had “full knowledge.” Hemphill, 595 U.S. at 152-53.
Without full knowledge, there cannot be a knowing and intelligent waiver. And without a waiver, the stipulations must be stricken from the record.
Additionally, because formal objections pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 51 are only relevant to a forfeiture analysis, the lack of a formal objection is irrelevant in the context of a constitutional waiver analysis. Moreover, one cannot dissent to that which he has not been made aware of.
Most importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation of the role of a trial judge being to ensure “constitutional procedures” for ensuring the integrity of evidence and stipulations makes it clear that the trial court’s handling of the stipulations in the instant case “presume[d] acquiescence” on the part of Defendant and was, therefore, constitutionally deficient. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
In the instant case, the record shows that the Court improperly presumed acquiescence in the waiver of Defendant’s fundamental constitutional Sixth Amendment-secured Right of Confrontation. Id.
These facts and circumstances in the instant case demonstrate a lack of “full knowledge” thereby negating any possibility of an intelligent waiver. Hemphill, 595 U.S. at 157.
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court is bound by Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent to strike, at minimum, the alleged testimonial stipulations in ECF 36 that refer to paragraphs from ECF 34. In particular, this would be ECF 36, Stipulation No. 1, Paragraphs 1 – 10, to the extent they refer to paragraphs at ECF 34.
In response to Defendant’s Motion for Production of Signed Testimonial Stipulations at ECF 192, the Government filed it’s Response at ECF 215. In that filing, AUSA Mietl included an exhibit at ECF 215-2 wherein he emails then-defense counsel Jason Freeman for permission to electronically file stipulations. Defense counsel Jason Freeman avoids answering and instead responds, “Please direct all further questions about it to Mick.” See ECF 215-2, Page 2 of 7. Afterwards, AUSA Mietl emails Mick Mickelsen to ask: “Mick, may I file this as agreed?” Id.
The structure of AUSA Mietl’s question reveals his misunderstanding. AUSA Mietl assumed Freeman had already agreed, but the email thread shows that Freeman only speculated that Defendant “will agree” and not that Defendant had actually agreed, which will be discussed in more detail below.
Nevertheless, Mickelsen then emailed Defendant, who was not privy to all of the prior email exchanges. To repeat, Defendant was not copied on any of the prior emails. Up until this point, Defendant had only provided Freeman with his own “proposed stipulations.” In Mickelsen’s email to Defendant, he wrote: “you must agree to the proposed stipulations. I strongly urge you to say yes and let’s put this matter to rest.” See ECF 215-2. The only “proposed stipulations” Defendant was aware up until this point were his own that he provided to Freeman.
Defendant, driving on the highway and viewing this email from his iPhone, assumed, due to the lack of context and explanation of what was transpiring behind-the-scenes, that Mickelsen was referring to Defendant’s own self-prepared “proposed stipulations” that Defendant had sent to defense counsel Jason Freeman the prior evening. Mickelsen’s email to Defendant did not provide any context. It did not explain that AUSA Mietl had edited Defendant’s proposed stipulations as ECF 215-2 now reveals. Further, there is no evidence that there were even any attachments to the email that Mickelsen sent to Defendant. Even assuming, arguendo, that there were attachments to the email Mickelsen sent to Defendant, which Defendant does not concede, nothing in Mickelsen’s email references any attachments and, as is common knowledge with iPhone users, you cannot see attachments unless you scroll to the very bottom end of the entire lengthy email thread. Again, Defendant had been out-of-town for Mother’s Day and was driving from New Braunfels back to Mansfield on a busy Monday after a major holiday when he viewed and responded to Mickelsen’s email.
This is again why the Fifth Circuit in Stephens in 1980, Reveles in 1999, and Ceballos in 2015 all made certain that the record reflected that the details of the stipulations were discussed or read in open court in the presence of the defendant. This was not done. It was not until the final day of trial that Defendant became aware that something was wrong.
Even on the final day of trial when the Court stated that the Government believed all elements of the offense were established through stipulations, there was no detailed discussion. Nevertheless, Defendant expressed his dissent to Freeman who then clarified on the record that the defense was not conceding that any of the deductions were fabricated. Defendant could not vocally object due to fear of being removed from the courtroom pursuant to the Anti-Hybrid Representation Rule, which unconstitutionally chilled Defendant’s ability to vocally dissent.
Moreover, AUSA Mietl apparently made edits but never updated the file name, which was misleadingly: “Castro Proposed Stips.docx”
We do not operate in a rigged “gotcha” legal system where a response to a vague email replied to from an iPhone while driving on a busy highway after a major holiday can be used without any safeguards to admit 331 of the Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact (99% of the facts needed to establish factual guilt), find a defendant guilty of all counts associated with non-testifying taxpayer-witnesses, and sentence him to 188 months in federal prison. The Court had a constitutional duty to ensure knowing consent to ensure a valid and intelligent waiver.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, it is the duty of the trial judge to ensure a valid waiver of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation. That duty was not fulfilled in this case. The Court failed to ensure that Defendant effectuated a valid waiver. Defendant did not waive his Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation.
The alleged testimonial stipulations at ECF 36, Stipulation No. 1, Paragraphs 1-10, to the extent they reference paragraphs at ECF 34, must be stricken from the record.
- Noncompliance with NDTX LCrR 49.5(d) Render the Alleged Stipulations Unsigned and Inadmissible
If the constitutional deficiencies of the alleged testimonial stipulations were not enough, there are also fatal procedural defects that affected Defendant’s substantial rights. As mentioned above, the Northern District of Texas’ Local Criminal Rule 49.5(d) required AUSA Mietl to both include a scanned image of Freeman’s signature in ECF 36 and to maintain the wet-ink signed paper copy of the “Stipulations of Evidence.”
The Government neither included a scanned image of Freeman’s signature nor has a wet-ink signed paper copy. These substantive failures render the alleged Stipulations of Evidence at ECF 36 unsigned and, therefore, inadmissible. See In re Complaint of River Constr. Inc., No. 4:32-cv-2413 (S.D. Tex. 2023).
Additionally, Freeman’s email to AUSA Mietl on Monday, May 13, 2024, at 11:41am merely speculated that “Mr. Castro will agree to not have the employee who conducted the interview.” See ECF 215-2. “Will agree” is not the equivalent of “has agreed.” Unless Freeman is clairvoyant, his statement as to what Defendant would or would not agree to was merely speculative.
Defendant was never asked whether he agreed to this. Freeman was apparently initially handling the discussion regarding stipulations before passing it to Mickelsen, and AUSA Mietl exploited the “Mr. Castro will agree” comment to falsely claim that there was already an agreement on this issue when, in fact, there was not. This is again why the underlying theme in all of the Fifth Circuit’s Sixth Amendment Waiver cases was full knowledge and understanding. That’s also why NDTX LCrR 49.5(d) exists.
All of this could have been avoided if AUSA Mietl had followed LCrR 49.5(d) and if the Court had required more detail and description of the alleged stipulations in the presence of Defendant. Moreover, the Stipulations were never properly introduced into evidence “during trial” as AUSA Mietl claimed in ECF 215, which is precisely why AUSA Mietl exerted unlawful influence on Court Reporter Debbie Saenz to delete the Court’s instruction on the first day of trial that it would only consider exhibits and evidence introduced during trial. With that directive deleted, it could be argued that ECF 36 was already admitted and not negated by the Court’s instructions on the first day of trial.
It is impossible for Freeman to have agreed because he expressly referred “all further questions” to Mickelsen, and Mickelsen’s email to AUSA Mietl excluded both Freeman and Defendant. See ECF 215-2. To repeat, when Mickelsen giddily emailed AUSA Mietl to mistakenly claim there was an agreement between Mickelsen and Defendant, Mickelsen did not copy either Defendant or Freeman on the email.
Freeman did not provide AUSA Mietl authorization to add his signature to ECF 36 prior to its filing. AUSA Mietl never obtained Freeman’s actual signature. AUSA Mietl did not scan Freeman’s actual signature for inclusion into ECF 36. AUSA Mietl does not have a wet-ink signed paper copy of the document.
Mickelsen misunderstood Defendant’s “I agree to them” response to incorrectly mean that Defendant was agreeing to AUSA Mietl’s heavily edited and counter-proposed stipulations.
AUSA Mietl then exploited Mickelsen’s “[w]e agree” response to knowingly falsely claim that Mickelsen and Freeman were in agreement when, in fact, Mickelsen was mistakenly claiming that Mickelsen and Defendant were in agreement, which led AUSA Mietl to unlawfully and procedurally improperly add Freeman’s signature to ECF 36. This is substantiated by AUSA Mietl’s comment in ECF 215 wherein he stated, “The government has also attached an email from defense counsel whereby *they* agreed to the stipulations.” The reference to “they” makes it clear that AUSA Mietl falsely claimed then and still falsely claims now that Mickelsen and Freeman jointly agreed, but the email exchange shows that Freeman was not copied on either Defendant’s response to Mickelsen or Mickelsen’s final email to AUSA Mietl. As such, Freeman’s signature was added without his knowledge or consent. NDTX LCrR 49.5(d) exists to avoid this precise situation. Had the rules been followed, this miscarriage of justice could have been avoided.
Moreover, because AUSA Mietl’s counter-offer voided Defendant’s initial offer, even Defendant’s original proposed stipulations would not be salvageable because, according to emails provided by AUSA Mietl, he did not accept the original proposed stipulations and instead made alterations and edits without Defendant’s knowledge.
This issue will reveal whether the Court’s Local Rules are “rules for thee, not me” or truly applicable to all.
Nothing about the manner by which the stipulations were handled in this case was legally sufficient. Whether analyzed under local rules, binding Fifth Circuit precedent, or substantive U.S. Supreme Court case law, the stipulations are deficient under all analyses and must, therefore, be stricken from the record.
- Counsel Cannot Stipulate to Factual Guilt Without the Knowledge of the Client
Even gratuitously assuming that the stipulations are somehow valid, which they are most definitely not and Defendant does not concede, counsel is not permitted to de facto plead guilty on behalf of a client who has clearly expressed and unequivocally asserted his innocence.
Stipulating to 99% of the Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact, including facts that Defendant expressly stated could be substantiated with taxpayer-provided documentation and email correspondence, is a de facto guilty plea. The metadata of the taxpayer data would have irrefutably established that it originated with the taxpayer and had not been altered.
In effect, the Government will argue that an attorney can de facto plead guilty on behalf of a client by stipulating to 99% of all of the Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact without the client’s knowledge, which the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court have both expressly rejected.
Based on the foregoing, the alleged testimonial stipulations must be stricken from the record.
- REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Because Defendant has alleged facts verified under 28 U.S.C. 1746 that, if proven, would entitle him to relief, it would be a reversible abuse of discretion for the Court to deny an evidentiary hearing when there are many material questions of fact that are in dispute that can only be resolved by the Court exercising its fact-finding function.
Defendant moves this Court to schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine the legal and constitutional sufficiency of the alleged Stipulations of Evidence.
- PRAYER
“You have neglected the more important matters of the law – justice.” Matthew 23:23. “You neglect justice and the love of God.” Luke 11:42. “Woe to those who.. deny justice to the innocent.” Isaiah 5:22-23. “All who have an eye for evil will be cut down; those who, with a word, make someone out to be guilty, who ensnare the defender in court and with false testimony deprive the innocent of justice.” Isaiah 29:20-21.
“Where is the God of justice?” Malachi 2:17. “Why does the way of the wicked prosper?” Jeremiah 12:1.
“Administer true justice… Do not plot evil against each other.” Zechariah 7:9-10. “For the Lord is a God of justice.” Isaiah 30:18.
“Your inequities have separated you from your God… no one calls for justice; no one pleads a case with integrity. They rely on empty arguments, they utter lies.” Isaiah 59:2-4. “How long, Lord, must I call for help?… Why do you tolerate wrongdoing?… Justice is perverted.” Habakkuk 1:2-4.
“This is what the Lord says to you… Administer justice every morning; rescue from the hand of the oppressor the one who has been robbed, or my wrath will break out and burn like fire because of the evil you have done.” Jeremiah 21:11-12.
“They… deny justice… Those who turn justice to bitterness… who hate the one who upholds justice in court and detests the one who tells the truth… Hate evil, love good; maintain justice in the courts…. let justice roll on like a river… But you have turned justice into poison.” Amos 2:7, 5:7-24, 6:12.
“You must return to your God.” Hosea 12:6. “For I, the Lord, love justice.” Isaiah 61:8.
“Have nothing to do with the fruitless deeds of darkness; rather, expose them.” Ephesians 5:11.
“If anyone knows the good they ought to do and does not do it, it is a sin.” James 4:17.
- REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Because Defendant has alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and because there are material questions of unsettled fact that are in controversy, this Court should schedule a limited evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of resolving the factual points of contention identified herein. In doing so, it would be revealed that there were many mistakes and outright frauds that resulted in the Court presuming Defendant had acquiesced to the loss of his Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation, which resulted in the improper admission of testimonial stipulations that caused this miscarriage of justice.
.
.
Faithfully in Christ,
/s/
John Anthony Castro
Defendant, Pro Se
FCI Oakdale I
Prisoner # 93890510
P.O. Box 5000
Oakdale, LA 71463
_______________________________________________________________________________
VERIFICATION
_______________________________________________________________________________
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, I, John Anthony Castro, knowingly subject to man’s criminal penalty of perjury, state that all of the following is believed to be true and correct.
/s/
_______________________________
Signature of John Anthony Castro
Castro’s Statement Following the Motion Submission
According to Castro, the trial was a sham. “They tricked me into supposedly agreeing to stipulations that I thought were my own, which is basically the same as someone tricking a person into pleading guilty. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have expressly held that the Government is not allowed to do that,” he states emphatically.
He goes on to accuse the government of blackmailing key witnesses to testify against him, specifically Linda Rivera and Ahmed Lampkin. “We have the proof,” Castro claims, referring to the revelations about Rivera’s own tax crimes, which he alleges were used to coerce her into lying. He recounts the struggle to keep evidence on the record, recalling how a judge initially struck his motion for a new trial—a motion that was only re-instated after Castro’s persistence in challenging it.
“Whenever the government suppresses evidence that undermines their witnesses, that’s a Brady violation,” Castro argues. “And that alone should entitle me to a new trial.” He continues to paint a damning portrait of what he believes to be systemic corruption: “When the government hides exonerating evidence and tricks you into agreeing to their version of the facts, it’s no longer a trial; it’s a fixed game.”
And now, with fresh evidence in hand, Castro lays out what he perceives to be the top tactics the DOJ uses to unfairly convict individuals:
The DOJ’s Dirty Tricks:
- Stipulation Sneak Attack
Castro claims the DOJ routinely deceives defendants into signing stipulations that essentially concede guilt, a tactic that directly contradicts both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit rulings. He advocates for a system where courts must ensure defendants are fully aware when they are being tricked into agreeing to the facts of their own guilt. - Hiding Evidence and Blackmailing Witnesses
According to Castro, the DOJ often blackmails witnesses to secure their testimony, while also suppressing any evidence that might discredit them. He stresses the need for the government to disclose their key witnesses ahead of trial to allow the defense to investigate the credibility of these individuals. - Bait and Switch Plea Agreements
While not affecting his case directly, Castro criticizes the government’s practice of making empty promises about reduced sentences, only to slam defendants with much harsher terms once they’ve agreed to the plea. - Fourth Amendment Violations
Castro points out that law enforcement often secures warrants under dubious circumstances, knowing that certain judges will sign off on them without question. Even if the warrants are later invalidated, evidence obtained under them is often still used in court due to the “good faith” exception—a practice he deems unconstitutional.
In Castro’s words: “Our judicial system is no better than Russia’s. It was rigged and fixed from the start.”
As he looks toward the future, Castro vows to fight for justice: “Once this is over, I’m going to devote my life to exposing these dirty tricks and fighting for fairness in the system. It’s time to make a change.”
Interview conducted by Renaldo C. McKenzie
Submitted by John Anthony Castro
Written and Edited by Rev. Renaldo C. McKenzie
Author of Neoliberalism: Globalization, Income Inequality, Poverty, and Resistance
President of The Neoliberal Corporation (The Neoliberal)
Creator and Host of The Neoliberal Round Podcast and YouTube Channel
Professor at Jamaica Theological Seminary and Doctoral Liberal Studies Candidate at Georgetown University
Watch the Episodes with John Anthony Castro leading up to his arrest here:
Castro V Trump Series: Part 1
The Full Series Playlist is on The Neoliberal YouTube Channel:
https://youtube.com/@renaldomckenzie
Published and Copyrighted by The Neoliberal Corporation. Dated May 13th, 2025.
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